Ingemarsson, Tang and Wong introduced the first GKA protocol in 1982 [20] on the basis of the key two-headed Diffie Hellman agreement [19]. Followed by koyama and Ohta [24], Blundo et al. [6] and Burmester and Desmedt [15]. Since then, a great deal of research on CPA and the security of ACA protocols has been presented, in part because of the distributed and dynamic nature of the ACA and the security challenges to be solved – see z.B. [1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34], and… [CHE 08] proposed a protocol for authenticating key agreements for IMS (IMSKAAP) to address the above issue. This IMSKAAP offers a secure key exchange and allows servers to support legal interceptions by integrating the benefits of the KTAP and KAAP protocols. The key exchange protocol is considered an important part of the cryptographic mechanism to protect end-to-end communications security. An example of the key exchange protocol is the exchange of Hellman files and keys [DIF 06, STA 10], which is known to be vulnerable to attack. To ensure a secure key exchange, [CHI 11] proposed a three-way exchange and agreement protocol (TW-KEAP). This minutes provide both parties to the communication with the same key to meeting secure communication.

The TW-KEAP concept stems from the four-part key exchange protocol, in which two customers are registered among the two different servers, and has expanded the benefits of the previous two protocols. Key mous that is verified by the password requires the separate implementation of a password (which may be smaller than a key) in a way that is both private and integrity. These are designed to withstand man-in-the-middle and other active attacks on the password and established keys. For example, DH-EKE, SPEKE and SRP are Diffie-Hellman password authentication variants. Although far from the only useful key exchange protocol, the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) protocol is used in a number of systems. D-H allows both parties to exchange an exchange (Bob and Alice) to provide some of the secret key. This is such that the entire key is not sent through the unsecured channel. Thus, a snoop will not receive the information necessary to steal the secret key. The minutes are as follows. Anonymous key exchange, such as Diffie-Hellman, does not offer authentication of parties and is therefore vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

FC-SP is a security image work that contains protocols to improve the security of fiber chains in several areas, including fiber chain device authentication, cryptographically secure key exchange and secure cryptographic communication between Fiber chain devices. FC-SP focuses on data protection during transmission across the Fibre Channel network. FC-SP is not interested in the security of data stored on the De Fibre Channel network. The Key Agreement Group (GKA) is an extension of the two-party agreement to groups of no ≥ 2 parties: it allows a group composed of several parties to set up a common meeting key (key) or a conference key via an unprotected network.